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Abstract Although pointing is not part of great apes’ natu-
ral gestural repertoire, they can learn to point to food, in
order to request it. To assess the Xexibility with which they
can use this gesture, one can vary the potential referent of the
point. In two previous studies, three orangutans (two of them
human-reared) have shown the ability to point to the location
of a tool which a human experimenter needed in order to give
them food. Here, we tested six orangutans and Wve bonobos
using a set-up in which our subjects had to guide a human
experimenter to the hiding place of a fork which was needed
in order to retrieve a piece of food for the subject out of a ver-
tical tube. We further examined the potential role of a com-
petitive/deceptive context by varying the identity of the
person responsible for hiding the tool. In addition, we imple-
mented three diVerent control conditions in which an object
was hidden but it was not necessary to indicate its location to
get the food. We found that the majority of subjects sponta-
neously guided the experimenter to the hiding place of the
fork by pointing to it when it was necessary and they did so
signiWcantly less in control conditions. We did not Wnd an
eVect of the person hiding the fork. Our results show that
mother-reared orangutans and bonobos are able to point to
inform a human about the location of an object that the
human needs to procure food for the subject and that they can
take into account whether it is relevant or not to do so.
Keywords Orangutans · Bonobos · Pointing · Flexibility · 
Theory of mind
Introduction
Index Wnger pointing (or some functional equivalent, e.g.,
lip pointing) to external entities is characteristic of human
gestural communication. Human children begin to point
by around their Wrst birthday and especially in this young
age when linguistic communication is restricted, pointing
is one of the major means to communicate. In sharp con-
trast, there is little evidence so far that great apes point in
the wild (e.g., Goodall 1986; Menzel 1973). In about
50 years of studying great apes in the wild there is only
one documented instance of one ape pointing for another
(Veà and Sabater-Pi 1998; see also Inoue-Nakamura and
Matsuzawa 1997). The closest behavior chimpanzees do is
to extend a hand to food held by others as a food begging
gesture or as a request for help in agonistic interactions (de
Waal and van HooV 1981). But many individuals in cap-
tivity learn to point spontaneously (i.e., without explicit
training) to food which is out of their reach to request it
from a human caregiver, even when the food is not visible
(e.g., Call and Tomasello 1994; Leavens et al. 2004;
WoodruV and Premack 1979). There is even one study in
which language-trained chimpanzees were reported to
point for one another to indicate which “lexigrams” they
wanted the other to press (Savage-Rumbaugh 1986). Addi-
tionally, for all four great ape species, especially for indi-
viduals that have been language-trained and reared in
close contact with humans, there are anecdotal descrip-
tions suggesting that they can point distally for things
other than food including objects they want or locations
they want to travel to (e.g., Miles 1990, Patterson 1978;
Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1986).
In the last decade, several studies have assessed pointing
in various settings in a more systematic fashion. Leavens
and colleagues have documented chimpanzees pointing
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and Hopkins 1998; Leavens et al. 1996, 2004). Menzel
(1999) described the chimpanzee Panzee pointing to a vari-
ety of food locations to inform a naive human after delays
of several hours. Russell et al. (2005) found that chimpan-
zees pointed to request from the experimenter a stick that
the chimpanzee needed in order to access food. Gómez and
Teixidor (1992) (see also Gómez 2004; Whiten 2000) and
Call and Tomasello (1994) went a step further and asked
whether orangutans are able to use pointing, not to request
a tool for themselves, but to guide the human to a hidden
tool that the human needed to access food for the ape. Two
of the orangutans in these studies pointed spontaneously
(and a third, after some additional training) to a location
where the ape, but not the human, had previously seen the
tool being hidden. They seemed to understand something
about the informative value of the pointing gesture, at least
what the human needed in the given situation and that
pointing to it would draw her attention or action to the ref-
erent of the point. So at least these orangutans, all of whom
had been raised by humans (at a nursery or in close contact
with humans) and one that had also received language
training, were able to use their pointing gestures Xexibly,
not only to request something, but also to direct a human to
an entity that was instrumental in obtaining food. However,
due to their contact with humans, it is unclear whether
mother-reared orangutans would behave in the same way.
There is another important aspect of these results. Guid-
ing the human to the hiding location could also have been
motivated by an understanding that the human did not
know where the fork was. A powerful variable that aVects
what humans tell or point out to others is what we think the
other knows or ignores. Typically, humans tend to tell oth-
ers (verbally or gesturally) things that they do not know and
they assume are of interest to them, or that it is in our inter-
est that they know, i.e., we inform them. Human communi-
cation is governed by this principle of “relevance” (Sperber
and Wilson 1986). Currently we know that apes are able to
point to request things and we know that apes, at least
chimpanzees, are able to take into account the attentional
state of partners in competitive (Bräuer et al. 2007; Hare
et al. 2000, 2006; Melis et al. 2006) and communicative
interactions (e.g., Gómez 1996; Kaminski et al. 2004;
Leavens et al. 2004). Moreover, chimpanzees also take into
account what others have and have not seen in the past in
competitive situations (Hare et al. 2001). But it is unclear
whether apes also take into account what someone else has
or has not seen in their communicative attempts. Can they
determine which aspects of a situation are “relevant” for
communicative purposes?
Gómez and Teixidor (1992)(see Gómez 1998, 2004 for
published reports of this study) addressed this question.
The female orangutan Dona was presented with a situation
in which she had to request food from a person by pointing
to one of two locked boxes. To retrieve the food, the exper-
imenter took the keys from a box where they were kept. In
the critical trials, the keys were hidden by the “caterer”
(i.e., the person who baited one of the boxes) in a diVerent
location before the experimenter entered the room. Dona
started to guide the human to the hiding location in the sec-
ond experimental trial, but only after the experimenter had
gone for the keys to the usual location and was not able to
Wnd them. Although this shows that Dona recognized that
the experimenter needed the keys, this behavior may not
demonstrate an ability to understand the state of ignorance
of the human because Dona pointed to the hiding location
after the experimenter had searched for the keys in the
wrong place. This means that Dona may have reacted to the
experimenter’s wrong behavior, not her knowledge state
and therefore, it does not imply a theory of mind ability
(Gómez 2004). After six sessions, Gómez and Teixidor
changed the procedure and had a stranger hide the keys in
the critical trials. From that point on, the subject pointed to
both keys and food at the beginning of each trial, before the
experimenter gave any sign of not being able to retrieve the
keys. In Control trials when the experimenter had hidden
the keys herself, Dona rarely pointed to the keys.
Gómez and Teixidor argued that the context of a stranger
playing a trick on the experimenter may have activated a
mind-reading (as opposed to behavior-reading) computa-
tion of the situation. There is evidence that the performance
of human children in theory of mind tasks can be enhanced
by presenting the story in a deceptive context (Núñez and
Rivière 2007). Telling the children that the agent is trying
to deceive the main character, instead of telling them that
the change of location happened inadvertently, enhances
the number of children able to predict correctly where the
main character will go in search of the object. This is con-
sistent with the Wnding that human adults do better in cer-
tain logical tasks if the task is posed in a deceptive context
(Cosmides 1989). Furthermore, mind-reading skills have
been recently found in chimpanzees when tested in compet-
itive situations (Hare and Tomasello 2004).
The current study had three goals. First, to test if mother-
reared orangutans, just like human-reared orangutans, can
also point to inform a human about the location of an object
that the human needs to procure food for the subject. This is
important because there have been some indications that
the gestural communication of enculturated apes may be
particularly sophisticated (Call and Tomasello 1996). Sec-
ond, to assess the performance of another ape species,
bonobos, in this task. These data are particularly important,
given that very little is known about bonobo pointing
behavior, practically nothing if one excludes the data from
language-trained bonobos. Third, to investigate whether
orangutans and bonobos take into account what a human123
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location of hidden objects.
We adopted the procedure of Gómez and Teixidor which
has also been successfully adapted for use with dogs, a
chimpanzee and human children (Virányi et al. 2006;
Whiten 2000). More speciWcally, we used the locked boxes/
hidden key procedure, and developed a new one in which a
human had to use a fork to retrieve a piece of food for the
subject. In experimental trials, the tool was hidden in an
unusual location in the presence of the animal but not of the
human experimenter. To assist the human in reaching the
food, it was necessary for the subject to guide her to the
hiding location by pointing to it. In the Control trials, an
unnecessary object was hidden, or the helper witnessed the
re-location of the tool (and the ape saw this) or the helper
hid the fork herself and therefore it was not necessary to
point to the tool location. This allowed us to investigate
whether apes would point indiscriminately regardless of the
object that was hidden or the amount of information that the
helper possessed about the location of the tool. Finally, we
also examined the potential role of a competitive/deceptive
context by varying the identity of the person responsible for




Six orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) and Wve bonobos (Pan
paniscus) participated in this experiment (Table 1). There
were seven females and four males ranging in age from 6 to
31 years. All subjects were born in captivity. Three bono-
bos were nursery-reared, whereas all other subjects were
mother-reared. All subjects were housed at the Wolfgang
Köhler Primate Research Center in the Leipzig Zoo
(Germany), where they lived with conspeciWcs in social
groups, with access to indoor and outdoor areas. Subjects
were fed according to their normal daily routine, that is,
four times a day on a diet of fruit, vegetables, cereals and
monkey chow. Water was available ad libitum, and subjects
were not deprived of food during the testing period.
Subjects were tested individually in a familiar indoor
testing room and could stop participating at any time. In
some sessions, another group member was present during
testing, but was kept in a separate compartment of the test-
ing room, as sometimes individuals refused to leave the
testing room. Subjects had participated previously or were
concurrently participating in other studies including studies
that required pointing to a food-baited container (e.g.,
object-choice tasks). So they were all used to pointing to
objects to indicate a choice and request them. Two orangu-
tans (Toba and Walter) served as subjects in the pilot study
in which we used a slightly diVerent procedure from that of
the main study. The diVerences between the two procedures
are noted below.
Materials
The testing room was divided into an ape area and a human
area by a set of transparent Plexiglas panels and mesh win-
dows (Fig. 1). On the experimenter’s side, it was possible
to Wx four platforms (80 cm £ 40 cm) perpendicular to
either a Plexiglas or a mesh panel. At the bottom of the
Plexiglas panel were three holes forming a straight line sep-
arated by 25 cm from center to center.
On one of the platforms, we mounted two vertical
opaque PVC tubes (5 cm in diameter £ 22 cm high) side by
side on a PVC board (66 cm £ 25 cm). We used the three
remaining platforms to create six hiding locations (two per
platform) by placing six easily distinguishable covers (a
rectangular yellow plastic box, a piece of paper, a piece of
jute, the cover of a shoe box, some straw and a piece of
Table 1 Species, age, sex, rear-
ing history, place of birth and 
experiment in which each sub-
ject participated
Subject Species Age at begin 
of study (years)
Sex Rearing history Place of birth Participation 
in experiment
Joey Bonobo 22 Male Human-reared Captivity Exp
Kuno Bonobo 8 Male Human-reared Captivity Exp
Limbuko Bonobo 9 Male Human-reared Captivity Exp
Ulindi Bonobo 11 Female Mother-reared Captivity Exp
Yasa Bonobo 8 Female Mother-reared Captivity Exp
Dokana Orangutan 15 Female Mother-reared Captivity Exp
Dunja Orangutan 31 Female Mother-reared Captivity Exp
Padana Orangutan 6 Female Mother-reared Captivity Exp
Pini Orangutan 16 Female Mother-reared Captivity Exp
Toba Orangutan 10 Female Mother-reared Captivity Pilot
Walter Orangutan 15 Male Mother-reared Captivity PilotExp main experiment, pilot pilot 
study123
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approximately). There were two covers on each platform
placed on opposite sides of the platform so that subjects
could point unambiguously to each of them by sticking a
Wnger through one of the outer holes in the panel or through
the mesh behind the cover, respectively. Each cover was
always presented at the same location. A box with a lid
(21.5 cm £ 19.5 cm £ 6.5 cm), placed on a stool on the
right side of the tubes, served to keep a 25-cm fondue-fork
that the experimenter needed to retrieve the rewards from
inside the tubes. The box was usually kept closed, so the
fork could not be seen during trials unless the experimenter
opened the lid.
The set-up and materials for the two pilot subjects repro-
duced the original “locked box/hidden key” scenario of
Gómez and Teixidor (1992). Walter and Toba began their
test with two lockable boxes (usual cash boxes) instead of
tubes. The experimenter needed a key, which was kept in
the tool box, to unlock the box instead of a fork. Further-
more, the covers were placed on the ground and later for
some trials on two wooden tables. Later on we introduced
the tubes/fork task whose logical structure was identical to
the box/key task, but it represented an improvement in the
set-up because the fork was directly connected to the food
when retrieving it, and the keys (unlike the fork) were very
small. As our subjects were used to indicating their choices
by pointing to objects through the holes in the panels (not
on the Xoor), we presented the covers on platforms in front
of the panels in the main study. Pointing to the Xoor also
made it harder for the experimenter to recognize the refer-
ent of the ape’s point. Walter and Toba changed to the
tubes and fork version after session 6 and 18, respectively.
For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to the “fork” even
in trials in which a key was used.
Procedure
Subjects received one daily session consisting of eight tri-
als. There were four diVerent kinds of trials: Exposure tri-
als, Test trials, Show fork trials and Control trials. There
were three phases: Familiarization, Testing and Control.
Depending on the phase, a session comprised a diVerent
number of the diVerent kinds of trials but always a total of
eight trials. Table 2 presents an overview of the diVerent
phases and trials.
Familiarization phase
This phase served to familiarize the subjects with the proce-
dure. Prior to the start of the Wrst sessions, one experi-
menter (the helper) showed the ape how the grapes could be
picked with the fork and that she could reach the inside of
the tubes only with the fork and not with her hand. Addi-
tionally, the helper took the fork out of its box and showed
it to another experimenter (the baiter) and to the subject and
put it back into the box.
Initially, the orangutans seemed reluctant to point to the
tubes to indicate the location of the food. It appeared that
Fig. 1 Experimental setup in 
the main study
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platform towards them, a procedure commonly used in the
object-choice tasks that they had received as part of previ-
ous studies. To remedy this situation, they received a step-
wise training in which the helper waited in three diVerent
positions, moving further and further away from the sub-
ject’s cage. Subjects needed between 13 and 19 training
sessions until they reliably pointed to the baited tube even
when the helper waited in her predetermined position. The
two orangutans in the pilot study did not require this train-
ing because the helper always stood behind the platform
with the tubes and subjects pointed right away.
During the Familiarization phase, subjects received eight
Exposure trials per session in which the baiter entered the
testing room, dropped a reward (usually a grape) in one of
the tubes and left. About 20–30 s later, the helper entered
the testing room and positioned herself on a designated
location between the tubes and the covers, 80–140 cm from
the subject’s cage (Fig. 1). Due to the diVerent sizes of the
orangutan and bonobo testing rooms, the experimenter was
closer to the bonobos than to the orangutans. For the two
pilot subjects, the helper went directly to the platform with
the tubes until session 24. We chose the more neutral loca-
tion in the main procedure to prevent introducing a bias for
pointing to the baited tube instead of pointing to the hiding
place. When the subject pointed to one of the tubes, the
helper went to the platform, kneeled down, put her hand on
the indicated tube and asked “Diese hier möchtest du?”
(“This is the one you want?”). If the ape did not correct her
choice, she took the fork out of the tool box. We introduced
this short delay to give subjects the chance to point to the
hiding place after pointing to the baited tube, but before the
helper had looked for the fork in the tool box. We introduced
the delay in session 29 of Walter and Toba and maintained
it for the main study.
If the subject’s choice was correct, the helper used the
fork to retrieve the grape and handed the grape to the sub-
ject. If the choice was incorrect, the helper showed the sub-
ject that there was no grape inside the tube by poking on the
bottom of the tube and showing her the empty fork and the
subject was allowed to make a second choice. If the subject
was not able to indicate the baited tube within 2 min, the
helper left the room and the baiter removed the food in the
beginning of the next trial. The position of the grape (left
vs. right) was randomly determined with two constraints:
not to be hidden on the same side in more than three con-
secutive trials, and to appear maximally once more on one
side than on the other overall during one session. Once sub-
jects pointed to the correct tube in at least 80% of the trials
in two consecutive sessions, the Testing phase started. Toba
and Walter (the two pilot subjects) began the Testing phase
after one and two Familiarization sessions, respectively.
Testing phase
This phase assessed whether subjects would point to the
fork, which had been moved from its original location,
which the helper needed to retrieve the food. A session con-
sisted of six Exposure trials, one Test trial (in which the
fork was hidden) and one Show fork trial. The order of the
Test trial and Show fork trial in a session was randomly
determined. The helper was unaware of the type of trial that
was in progress, the location of the food in the tubes and the
location of the fork.
Test trials were identical to Exposure trials except in that
the baiter hid the fork under one of the six covers after baiting
Table 2 Overview of the diVerent phases of the study: number of daily sessions, number of diVerent types of trials per session and description of
the diVerent types of trials for each phase of the study
The Familiarization phase served to get the subjects used to pointing to the tubes; fork used by helper to retrieve grape. The Testing phase assessed
whether subjects would indicate a re-location of the fork; fork hidden in one of the eight trials. The Control phase tested whether subjects would
still indicate the hiding place when there was no need to do so; irrelevant object hidden or helper knew about the whereabouts of the fork
Phase # of daily sessions # of trial-types 
per session
Description of trial-types
Familiarization Pilot Walter: 2 sessions, Toba: 1 session 8 Exposure Fork successfully used 
to retrieve grapeMain study Variable until subject 
reached 80% correct
Testing Variable until subject reached criterion to move 
to the Control phase, divided into 12-session 
blocks of Baiter/Stranger hiding the fork
6 Exposure
1 Show fork Attention drawn to fork
1 Test Fork hidden
Control 15 Sessions (administered in 3 blocks 




1 Control Three diVerent situations in which 
something was hidden but pointing 
to the hiding place was not needed123
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stranger) entered the room after the baiter had left the room
and hid the fork (Stranger hides). To emphasize their
deceptive intent, strangers behaved in a sneaky fashion
while hiding the fork (e.g., looking around as if checking
whether someone can see her). Each subject received sev-
eral 12-session blocks with either the baiter or the stranger
hiding the fork, with the order of presentation counterbal-
anced across subjects. The two pilot subjects received
stranger and baiter blocks of Xexible length. About 10–25 s
after the stranger/baiter had left the room, the helper came
in. If the subject pointed to a tube, she behaved exactly like
in Exposure trials. When she opened the tool box and
noticed that the fork was not inside, she showed the subject
that the box was empty by holding it upside down and dem-
onstrated that she could not reach the grape by trying to
reach into the tube with her hand. If then the subject
pointed to a cover, the helper touched it asking “Dieses hier
möchtest du?” (“This is the one you want?”) and lifted it if
the subject did not correct her choice. If it was the correct
cover (i.e., the actual hiding place of the fork), she took out
the fork and used it to retrieve the food. If it was an incor-
rect one, she showed the subject that the place was empty,
and the subject could guide her to another cover. If the sub-
ject was not able to indicate the correct hiding location
within 2 min, the helper left the room and the baiter or the
stranger came back, retrieved the fork, removed the food
and put the fork back into the tool box. If the subject
pointed to a cover before pointing to a tube, the helper Wrst
retrieved the fork and then returned to the tubes waiting for
the subject to indicate the baited one. Trials in the pilot
study did not have a predetermined length. For purposes of
comparability with the non-pilot subjects, we did not score
the subject’s behavior after 2 min if the helper stayed in the
testing room for longer.
Show fork trials were identical to Exposure trials except
that, after the baiter had baited one of the tubes, she took
the fork out of the tool box, showed it to the subject and put
it back into the tool box. These Show fork trials served to
have the subject’s attention drawn to the fork in one trial
like in Test trials but with no reason to point to its location.
As soon as the subject reached a criterion of pointing to the
hiding location of the fork before the helper started looking
for the fork in the tool box, in three consecutive sessions or
in four sessions out of Wve, the Control phase started. If
subjects did not reach this criterion in 36 Testing sessions
they were advanced to the Control phase anyway.
Control phase
This phase tested whether subjects would point to the fork
after the helper had either witnessed its change of location
or had moved the fork herself, and whether they would
point to other hidden objects that the helper did not need to
retrieve the food. The Control phase comprised 15 sessions.
A session in this phase consisted of Wve Exposure trials,
one Test trial, one Show fork trial, and one of three diVerent
types of Control trials.
In the Straw control, the baiter hid a piece of straw
(about 23 cm £ 6 cm). This controlled for the possibility
that the subjects were pointing in response to the act of hid-
ing per se. Subjects were not expected to point if they
understood that it was the fork that the helper needed. In the
Helper hiding control, the helper hid the fork herself at the
end of the preceding trial, while in the Helper witness con-
trol, the helper was present and watched how the baiter hid
the fork. So in both these controls, subjects did not need to
guide the helper to the hiding location if they understood
that the helper in these trials knew where the fork was hid-
den. Each of the three diVerent controls was administered in
a block of Wve consecutive sessions, with each subject
receiving the three controls in a diVerent order.
A diVerence in the procedure of the Helper hiding con-
trol between orangutans an bonobos should be noted. For
the orangutans the helper hid the fork, left the room, then
the baiter baited the tube and after she had left, the helper
came back. In contrast, for the bonobos the helper entered
after the baiter had baited the tube, left and came back
again after a few seconds. We introduced this change for
the bonobos because the orangutans may have been less
likely to point in Control trials because they tended to stay
close to the location where something had been hidden last.
In this way, we made sure that the bonobos were as much
focused on the hidden fork in Control as in Test trials as the
sequence was exactly the same in both conditions.
Data scoring and analysis
Data were based on live coding and video coding by the
helper (FZi for the orangutans; FZe for the bonobos). The
response period for indicating the location of the fork
started when the helper opened the door to the testing room
and ended as soon as the helper had found the fork or after
2 min (although 2 min were allowed, usually the Wrst
response occurred early, within the Wrst 10–20 s of the
trial). For this time span, the helper scored to which hiding
location the subjects pointed and whether they pointed to
the tool box. “Points” were deWned as inserting a Wnger
through one of the outer Plexiglas holes or through the
mesh so that it protruded in the direction of one of the men-
tioned objects. The coder also noted whether the subject
pointed to the hiding place before the helper had started
looking for the fork (i.e., before she had opened the tool
box). This was important to determine whether subjects
were able to anticipate the experimenter’s lack of knowl-
edge in those trials in which the fork had been moved from123
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were canceled if the subject did not point to the tubes in
three consecutive trials. This happened in two sessions for
Walter. One session of Padana was excluded due to experi-
menter error (a wrong Control trial, Giver hides instead of
Straw control was administered in session 46).
For reliability purposes, the two helpers served as sec-
ond coder for each other. FZi coded 20% of the bonobo tri-
als and FZe coded 20% of the orangutan trials. Cohen’s
Kappa for the orangutans was 0.98 for points to covers,
1.00 for correct versus incorrect points, 1.00 for order of
pointing (i.e., points to covers before or after the helper
opened the tool box) and 0.66 for points to the tool box. For
the bonobos, Cohen’s Kappa was 0.98 for points to covers,
1.00 for correct versus incorrect points, 1.00 for order of
pointing and 0.77 for points to the tool box. Reliabilities for
points to the tool box were lower as it was very hard to see
on the video when apes pointed to the tool box.
We compared the percentage of points to the tool box
and covers across the diVerent types of trials and how they
changed over time. Since subjects advanced phases contin-
gent upon reaching predetermined criteria (and diVerent
subjects progressed at diVerent speeds), we selected the Wrst
30 sessions with Test trials to conduct our comparisons
over time. We analyzed subjects’ pointing accuracy to hid-
ing locations and whether they pointed to the food or the
fork Wrst (both for Test trials). We used two-tailed non-
parametric statistics for all analyses.
Results
Familiarization phase
The nine subjects of the main study (the pilot subjects are
excluded from this analysis because the experimenter
decided when they advanced to the Testing phase) needed a
median of 13 Familiarization sessions (range: 2–19; N = 9;
see Table 3 for details) before advancing to the next phase.
Testing phase
In the Testing phase, two bonobos (Joey and Ulindi) did not
point to a cover in 36 sessions and were therefore excluded
from all subsequent analyses. The two pilot subjects are
included in all the following analyses leading to a total of
nine subjects.
Figure 2a presents the percentage of trials in which the
subjects pointed to the covers (irrespective of whether it
was the actual hiding place or not) in each type of trial of
the Testing phase over time. Overall there were signiWcant
diVerences between trial types (Friedman test = 14.82, df = 2,
N = 9, P = 0.001; Test trials: median = 93.6, inter-quartile
range = 79.7–97.6; Show fork trials: median = 0, inter-
quartile range = 0–2.8; Exposure trials: median = 0.91,
inter-quartile range = 0.21–1.78). Pairwise comparisons
revealed that apes pointed signiWcantly more often to a
cover in the Test trials than the other two types of trials
(Wilcoxon test: z = 2.67, N = 9, P = 0.008 in both cases). In
contrast, there were no signiWcant diVerences between the
Show fork and Exposure trials (Wilcoxon test: z = 0.34,
N = 9, P = 0.74).
We examined when subjects started to indicate a cover
in Test trials (i.e., when the fork was hidden). Subjects
started to point to the covers within two sessions as a
median (range: 1–10). Four subjects (two orangutans and
two bonobos) pointed in their Wrst Test trial and two sub-
jects (two orangutans) pointed in their second Test trial
(Table 3). Walter who was the last subject to start point-
ing (in his tenth Testing session) had started to lead the
helper to the hiding location of the fork already in his
eighth Testing session by positioning himself close to the
respective cover and staring at it (a behavior that was not
considered in the analyses). There was no signiWcant
diVerence in the onset of pointing between the two species
(Mann–Whitney Test: Z = 0.81, N = 9, P = 0.42; Bonobos
(N = 3): median = 1, inter-quartile range = 1–3; Orangu-
tans (N = 6): median = 2, inter-quartile range = 1.00–
6.25).
Figure 2b presents the percentage of trials in which the
subjects pointed to the tool box for each trial type of the
Testing phase over time. Overall, there were no signiWcant
diVerences between trial types (Friedman test = 1.86,
df = 2, N = 9, P = 0.39; Test trials: median = 2.4, inter-
quartile range = 0–8.2; Show fork trials: median = 0, inter-
quartile range = 0–23.8; Exposure trials: median = 0.85,
inter-quartile range = 0.2–15.3). Moreover, there were no
signiWcant diVerences in the onset of pointing between trial
types (Friedman test = 4.20, df = 2, P = 0.12; Test trials:
median = 12; Show fork trials: median = 27; Exposure tri-
als: median = 5).
Figure 3 presents the accuracy of pointing to the hid-
ing place in Test trials. Subjects pointed directly to the
correct cover (i.e., the hiding place of the fork) in 60.9%
of trials, which is signiWcantly above chance levels (Wil-
coxon test against the expected 16.7%: z = 2.67,
P = 0.008). Adding correct direct points and correct
points after switching (i.e., pointing to the actual hiding
place of the fork after having pointed to an empty cover
Wrst) accounted for 73.7% of the trials. There were no
signiWcant diVerences between the species with regard to
correct pointing and correct pointing after switching
(Mann–Whitney Test: Z = 1.9, N1 = 3, N2 = 6, P = 0.20
in both cases).
Next we analyzed whether subjects were more likely to
point to a cover before or after the helper had looked for the123
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overall signiWcant diVerences in the mean frequency of
these two strategies (Wilcoxon test: z = 1.13, N = 9,
P = 0.26; fork Wrst: median = 38.5, inter-quartile
range = 28.6–51.9; food Wrst: median = 52.9, inter-quartile
range = 37.5–60.1), a strategy switch took place over time.
Figure 4 presents the percentage of Test trials in which sub-
jects pointed to a cover before or after the helper had
looked inside the tool box over the Wrst 30 sessions. Sub-
jects signiWcantly increased their preference for pointing to
a cover before the helper had looked for the fork (rs = 0.85,
P < 0.001, n = 30) and decreased their preference for point-
ing to a cover after the helper had looked for the fork
(rs = ¡0.45, P = 0.012, n = 30).
Control phase
One orangutan (Dunja) did not reach the criterion to move
on to the Control Phase and was therefore excluded from
subsequent analyses. Figure 5 presents the percentage of
trials in which the remaining eight subjects pointed Wrst to a
cover (irrespective of whether it was the actual hiding place
of the fork) in the various trial types of the Control phase
(15 Test trials, 5 trials of each Control type; for deviations
see Table 3). There were signiWcant diVerences between
trial types (Friedman test: Chi-square = 11.87, df = 3,
N = 8, P = 0.008). Pairwise comparisons between the Test
trials when compared to all Control trial types revealed that
subjects pointed signiWcantly more often in the Test trials
Table 3 Exact protocol each subject received in each phase of the study
Familiarization phase number of sessions each individual received, Testing phase number of sessions, number of Stranger/Baiter-blocks, order of
hiders (SB Stranger-Baiter; BS Baiter-Stranger) and session in which each individual indicated a cover for the Wrst time, Control phase order in
which each individual received the controls (H hides Helper hides control, Straw Straw control, H witness Helper witness control) and how often
each individual pointed to a cover in a Control trial
a Order of blocks with diVerent persons hiding the fork: BS Baiter-Stranger, SB Stranger-Baiter; the last block often contained less than 12 sessions
b The order of controls reXects the order in which the subject received the diVerent types of controls (H hides Helper hides control, Straw Straw
control, H witness Helper witness control)
c Number of trials in which the subject pointed to a cover/total number of trials
Subject Species Familiarization Testing Control
# of sessions # of sessionsa Session # Order of 
controlsb
# of points 
to coverc
Joey Bonobo 12 37 in 3 blocks (SB) –












Ulindi Bonobo 16 36 in 3 blocks (SB) –












Dunja Orang 13 51 in 5 blocks (BS) Fifth –












Toba (pilot) Orang 1 (Wxed) 46 in 3 blocks 







Walter (pilot) Orang 2 (Wxed) 42 in 2 blocks 
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control: z = 1.99, P = 0.046; Straw control: z = 2.37,
P = 0.018; Helper witness control: z = 2.20, P = 0.028).
The frequency of pointing Wrst to the cover remained stable
across the three blocks of trials for the Test (Friedman test:
2 = 0.30, df = 2, N = 8, P = 0.86) and Control trials (Fried-
man test: 2 = 1.46, df = 2, N = 8, P = 0.48) and the diVerence
between Test and Control trials was already apparent in the
Wrst block of trials (Wilcoxon test: z = 2.38, P = 0.017).
The two species did diVer in one respect: the bonobos
pointed signiWcantly more to the covers than the orangutans
in the Helper hides control (Mann–Whitney test: Z = 2.00,
N = 8, P = 0.047; Bonobos (N = 3): median = 60, inter-
quartile range = 40–100; Orangutans (N = 5): median = 20,
inter-quartile range = 10–35).
We also assessed whether the type of person hiding the
fork (stranger vs. baiter) had an inXuence on the subjects’
performance in the Wrst block of sessions (10 sessions for
Toba, 12 for all other subjects; n = 9, Dunja included). Sub-
jects who received Stranger trials Wrst did not start to point
to the covers in Test trials earlier (Mann–Whitney Test:
Z = 0.13, N = 9, P = 0.090; Stranger (N = 4): median = 1.5,
inter-quartile range = 1–8; Baiter (N = 5): median = 2,
inter-quartile range = 1–4) nor did they point more to the
covers in Test trials (Mann–Whitney test: Z = 0.74, N = 9,
Fig. 2 Mean percentage of trials in which subjects pointed to the cov-
ers (a) and the tool box (b) during the Wrst 30 sessions of the Testing
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Fig. 4 Percent of subjects that pointed to the covers during the Wrst 30
sessions of the Testing phase before or after the helper attempted to re-
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Fig. 5 Mean percentage of trials in which subjects pointed to the cov-
ers as a function of condition in the Control phase (N = 8). Asterisks
indicate signiWcant diVerences (P < 0.05) between Test trials and the
















356 Anim Cogn (2009) 12:347–358P = 0.46; Stranger: median = 75, inter-quartile range = 30–
90; Baiter: median = 83, inter-quartile range = 61–96).
They also did not start pointing to the covers before the
helper looked for the fork earlier (Mann–Whitney test:
Z = 0.13, N = 9, P = 0.90; Stranger: median = 10, inter-
quartile range = 6.25–12.25; Baiter: median = 8, inter-quar-
tile range = 5–16). Thus, subjects who experienced
Stranger trials Wrst did not perform better than subjects who
experienced Baiter trials Wrst.
Discussion
Orangutans and bonobos used pointing gestures to indicate
hidden targets to people. The apes1 not only pointed consis-
tently to hidden food to request it but also to a hidden fork
that the human needed to retrieve the food for the ape.
Although such Xexible pointing has been previously docu-
mented in human-reared and enculturated apes (e.g., Call
and Tomasello 1994; Gómez and Teixidor 1992; Kellogg
and Kellogg 1933; Savage-Rumbaugh 1986; Whiten 2000),
this study extends those Wndings to apes that have not been
raised in a human-like environment. More speciWcally, in
this study, six orangutans and three bonobos indicated the
location of a fork that the human experimenter, but not the
ape, was going to use. Pointing to the fork appeared sponta-
neously (the majority of the apes produced it from their Wrst
or second session) in conjunction to pointing to the desired
goal (the baited tube) and was used more often in Test trials
where the human did not know about the relocation of the
fork. This suggests that apes understood the referential
eVect of their pointing gestures, i.e., that pointing has the
power to selectively identify targets for others. Apes might
learn to point in captivity by reaching towards the objects
they want to get and learning that humans will give them to
them. Our results show that their acquisition would in any
case go beyond the function of acquiring items into a more
referential use where the pointing action is no longer
addressed to the ultimately desired item.
It is unclear, however, whether pointing was aimed at
informing the human of the whereabouts of the fork (in the
sense of making them know where the fork was), or it was
aimed at directing them to the fork (Gómez 2004), i.e., some
form of elaborate imperative where they are asking the human
to retrieve the fork from its hiding and proceed to extract
the food for them (Gómez 2004; Tomasello et al. 2007).
Whatever the primary motive behind the pointing might be,
the key question is, to what extent the apes understand that the
human will not be able to Wnd the fork without their help, i.e.,
to what extent the apes take into account the ignorance of the
human when the hiding of the fork occurs in her absence.
Human communication is modulated by a principle of “rele-
vance” (Sperber and Wilson 1986). We tell or point out to
others what we think that they have to know, i.e., we inform
them of relevant things. The apes’ pointing was functionally
relevant. First, they selectively directed people to the fork’s
location (as opposed to distractor targets) when the fork’s
position had been changed, but not when it was in its usual
position or it was handled by the baiter, but then placed back
in its usual place (Show fork trials). In Exposure trials, apes
typically pointed to the food location only. In contrast, in Test
trials they pointed to the food and to the relocated fork. Cru-
cially, the probability of pointing to the fork was signiWcantly
higher when it was hidden in the absence of the helper, than
when it was hidden by the helper herself (at least in the case of
the orangutans) or by another person but in the presence of the
helper. Apes adapted their pointing to the information that
was available or unavailable to the addressee: in the Test trials
they pointed out to the human agent a new referent (the fork)
that in Exposure trials was taken for granted. They could have
pointed to both the food and fork in all the situations; however
they signiWcantly pointed to the fork when its whereabouts
had changed, especially when this had happened in the
absence of the helper. This mimics the relevance property of
human communication.
It has been argued that in humans, relevance is achieved
using theory of mind or mind-reading skills, which allow us
to compute what others know, expect or ignore, and adapt
our messages accordingly. Did the apes in our study
achieve relevance by means of mind-reading skills, such as
attributing knowledge and ignorance? An analysis across
sessions shows that initially pointing to the fork occurred in
response to the wrong searching behavior of the human,
i.e., after the human had went to retrieve the fork from its
usual place and did not Wnd it. Anticipation that the human
needs to be directed to the hiding place of the fork without
behavioral signs of ignorance appeared only progressively,
eventually becoming the dominant strategy. This is similar
to what Gómez and Teixidor reported with their orangutan,
Dona, who initially pointed to the hidden key only in
response to the wrong search behavior by the human. How-
ever, Dona’s shift in strategy occurred abruptly, coinciding
with the introduction of a complete stranger as hider,
whereas in the present study the shift was more gradual.
Although the fork Wrst strategy was suddenly adopted by
some subjects, invariably they reverted to the food Wrst
strategy at some point throughout testing thus resulting in a
gradual change, especially when the data from all individu-
als was considered together.
1 As usual with ape studies, we found pronounced individual diVer-
ences. Two of the apes (two bonobos) completely failed to point to the
covers, and just pointed to the food. Also, our subjects did not always
indicate the correct hiding place. In some instances, the apes would
point to the wrong cover; usually correctly rectifying when the human
failed to Wnd the fork there.123
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numerous occasions even when it was not needed because
the helper knew the whereabouts of the fork. Consequently,
this can be interpreted as evidence that apes did not possess
human-like full-blown mind-reading skills. How can we
reconcile these two Wndings? One possibility is that apes
may go some way towards developing a simple version of
what Tomasello et al. (2007) call sharing a “common con-
ceptual ground” or a “joint attentional frame”, in the sense
of sharing contexts that are “known together”—an ability
that has been attributed to human infants as early as at
12 months of age (Tomasello et al. 2007). There is recent
evidence suggesting that human infants may be speciWcally
adapted and motivated to do this sort of thing from very
early (Liebal et al. 2008; Moll and Tomasello 2007; Toma-
sello and Haberl 2003) and in more complex ways, but apes
may show here an evolutionary precursor of this (for exam-
ple what Gómez (2008) calls the ability to code relations of
“intentional availability” between agents and targets).
Our Wndings are consistent with reports suggesting that
other apes (chimpanzees) can use some form of “knowl-
edge versus ignorance” attribution in competitive contexts
(Bräuer et al. 2007; Hare et al. 2001; Melis et al. 2006), but
extend them to other species of apes and to a interspeciWc
cooperative communicative context. Gómez’s (2004) sug-
gestion that introducing a competitive element (fork hidden
by strangers) would improve performance was not sup-
ported by our results. Ape performance was similar whether
the fork was hidden by known people or strangers. How-
ever, the special conditions of the Leipzig center (where
apes are used to the regular presence of new people in the
testing compartments) may have invalidated this manipula-
tion (in contrast with Gómez and Teixidor’s study, where
the compartment in which the stranger appeared was
strictly limited to keepers and the people in the experi-
menter team). The possibility that competitive factors facil-
itate performance in apes other than chimpanzees remains,
therefore, an open question for future research.
In sum, bonobos and orangutans were capable of tailor-
ing their communication in knowledge/ignorance scenarios.
They repaired the inability of an agent to act upon a target
by indicating the location of the target using an explicit ref-
erential signal (pointing). They did so initially in response
to behavioral signs of inability, but went on to anticipate
when this was needed, spontaneously discriminating among
superWcially similar situations. Although pointing was here
part of a cooperative task, the ultimate beneWciaries of the
cooperative actions were the apes. It remains to be deter-
mined if apes can point for purely altruistic purposes
(cooperation where they are not the beneWciaries of the
information transmission), as human infants do from
around 12 months of age (Liszkowski et al. 2006), for
example showing to humans the whereabouts of an object
that is of use only to the human (a behavior Liszkowski
et al. 2006 considered the true hallmark of “informative
pointing”).
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